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Abstract
For the most part, the law eschews the role of moral character in legal blame. But when
we observe an actor who causes harm, legal and psychological blame processes are in tension.
Procedures for legal blame assume an assessment of the actor’s mental state, and ultimately of
responsibility, that is independent of the moral character of the actor. In this paper, I present
experimental evidence to suggest that perceptions of intent, foreseeability, and possibly
causation can be colored by independent reasons for thinking the actor is a bad person, and are
mediated by the experience of negative moral emotion. Our emotional reactions are not only a
product of the act and the outcome, but also a product of inferences about the general
virtuousness of the person who performed the act that caused the harm. Remarkably, this result
holds true even though the mental state of the actor was clearly specified. As observers, we give
the benefit of the doubt to a person with a virtuous character who causes harm; we perceive his
actions as less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less foreseeable than if his
character is flawed. Remarkably, it seems that we do not deliberately use character information
to inform responsibility judgments, for when differences in character are made explicit, we
moderate our judgments so that we hold the virtuous harmdoer equally responsible as the ignoble
harmdoer.

INTRODUCTION

When we assign blame for something bad that happened, we are doing something
social—we are identifying another human being who caused harm, without justification or
excuse. A window broken by a hurricane elicits a story about cause, but not a story about blame;
a window broken by a person elicits blame attribution. Once a human agent is identified, we
naturally turn our attention to blame severity, a complex judgment shaped by several different
∗
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concerns. A window broken by a child’s stray baseball is assessed differently from a window
broken by a vandal, or by a burglar, or by a white supremacist. Assessing blame involves not
only determining the badness of the harm (for example, property damage versus injured person),
but also the badness of the actor’s mental state (for example, accident versus intentional), and
perhaps even the badness of the actor’s motive (for example, general destructiveness versus
racial hatred). When viewed this way, we see that blame, -- as a psychological matter -- involves
attributions about other people and the extent to which they intend to harm us or otherwise pose
a threat to the social order. In this sense, blaming is social because it is about attributions of other
people and their intentions.
The law takes account of each of the blame dimensions just mentioned. The criminal law
reserves more severe offense categories for more severe harm. It imposes more serious liability
when mens rea is more culpable, all else being equal. And sometimes, as is the case with hate
crimes, it explicitly takes into account the actor’s motive for causing harm. But there is another
possible influence on blame not yet mentioned—an influence which the law has sought to
minimize. The moral character of the actor, apart from that actor’s motive or reasons for acting,
might play an important role as a descriptive matter in the psychological process of blame. Yet,
for the most part, the law eschews the role of moral character in legal blame. 1

1

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (permitting admission of evidence of the defendant’s bad character only when it is
used in specific rebuttal to evidence of good character submitted by the defense). By contrast, the criminal law
embraces the consideration of the defendant’s character in sentencing judgments. For example, the U.S. Code
provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). In practice, the Presentence Investigation Report “may
contain a wide range of information about the defendant, all of which may be considered by the court in determining
the sentence.” Sentencing Guidelines, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 681, 725 n. 2161 (2009). For a
dissenting view, see Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2003). The focus in this article
is primarily on blame, rather than punishment judgments.
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In a previous article, we explored empirically the question of motive for acting, and how
it produces inferences about moral character that influence blame judgments. 2 By contrast, the
first overarching goal of the current article is to provide experimental evidence supporting the
hypothesis that psychological blame is influenced by perceptions of the actor’s overall virtue or
lack thereof, even apart from the actor’s reason for acting in the specific instance. This article
marshals experimental evidence to support the idea that a person with a flawed moral character is
blamed more for causing harm than a person who is otherwise virtuous. Thus, we are likely to
blame more severely a drug-addicted high school dropout who knocks down ten rural mailboxes
with a baseball bat than an A-student who is on the chess team who engages in the same action.
Similarly, we are likely to blame more severely an abusive parent who drives recklessly and
unintentionally hits a pedestrian than a model parent who performs the same act with the same
mens rea. The experiment reported here implements a rigorous test of this hypothesis and shows
that even mildly unpleasant character traits, such as unreliability, can lead observers to blame
more harshly, and to bolster these harsh blame judgments with increased perceptions of the
actor’s causal role and his intent to cause harm.
The findings reported here echo research examining criminal cases suggesting that the
defendant’s prior criminal record can influence jury verdicts. For example, in cases where
evidence is weak, there is a positive correlation between the jury learning that the defendant had
committed prior crimes and the likelihood of conviction. 3 This suggests that in the absence of
compelling evidence tending to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact that the defendant had
committed prior crimes as a reason to think he might be guilty of the crime in question. Existing
2

Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
3
See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal
Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1388 (2009) (noting that data
suggest that disclosure of prior crimes increases the chances of conviction in close cases).
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experimental research also suggests that information about prior crimes can increase the
likelihood of criminal conviction. 4 These findings are important, but they focus on the narrow
question of the influence of prior crimes on verdicts in criminal cases. By contrast, the focus of
this article is more expansive. First, the focus here is on the influence of moral character broadly,
not just on inferences drawn from prior crimes. 5 Instead of examining the effect of an
emotionally provocative criminal violation of the social contract, such as the influence of the
defendant’s prior armed robbery, this article focuses on subtle cues about the actor’s character
traits, such as generosity and reliability, and shows that even mild virtue deficits lead to more
severe blame judgments. Second, the focus of this article is on blame generally, not just on
verdicts; it is on the basic social–psychological question of how blaming processes work, both in
court and out of court, and both within the law and in everyday social life. To that end, rather
than examining the influence of a person’s prior criminal record, as previous scholars have done,
4

This relationship appears to be strongest when the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in nature or similar to the
current accusation. See Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior-Record Evidence on Juror Decision
Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 69 (1995) (summarizing prior research indicating that evidence of prior
convictions affects chances of conviction, especially if “the prior conviction was for an offense similar to the one
jurors were deciding”); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237–38 (1976) (discussing potential ways that revealing a
defendant’s criminal record might alter a verdict);Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the
Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753–55 (2000) (“The results
clearly confirm that evidence of previous convictions can have a prejudicial effect, especially when there is a recent
previous conviction for a similar offence.”); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 42 (1985)
(disclosure of similar prior crime increases the likelihood of conviction more than disclosure of dissimilar prior
crime).
5
The mechanism by which information that the defendant committed prior crimes increases the likelihood of
conviction is still not entirely clear. It is likely that perceivers treat prior crimes as evidence of propensity to commit
the current offense that operates within a specific category—the idea being, for example, “once a burglar, always a
burglar.” Support for this idea has emerged from several experiments, which demonstrate that mock jurors are more
likely to convict when the defendant’s prior crimes are similar to the current offense, compared to when the prior
crimes are dissimilar to the current offense. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 43 (“[T]he highest conviction
rate occurred when the prior conviction was the same as the present charge.”). It is also possible that the positive
correlation between prior crimes and likelihood of conviction is partially accounted for by credibility concerns—a
testifying defendant who is impeached with evidence that he committed prior crimes involving deceit may be more
likely to be convicted. Additionally, part of the variance might be accounted for by jurors’ inferences about the
defendant’s dangerousness, which is arguably another version of the propensity thesis, in which the propensity
inference is made across the broad category of violent acts. The important point here, however, is that none of these
explanations for the association between prior crime and likelihood of conviction is focused on the broad idea of
moral character, which is the focus of this article.
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I instead examine the influence of subtle cues about character, such as whether someone works
hard or goofs off on the job.
In addition to testing a more expansive notion of moral character, a second goal of this
article is to explore the extent to which the influence of moral character varies with the actor’s
mental state. For example, is a negligent actor with a bad character blamed just as much as a
reckless actor with a good character? Mental states, after all, are often difficult to know with
precision. A driver who kills a small child after he runs a stop sign while he is dialing his cell
phone is reckless 6 if he is conscious of and disregards the risk that someone might die; he is
negligent 7 if he was merely careless without consciously disregarding this risk. 8 But it is difficult
to glean another person’s mental state with such precision. If we think the driver might have been
aware of the risk of death, knowing that the driver is a person of poor moral character might be
enough to push us toward a more severe blame judgment. Conversely, knowing the driver is an
otherwise virtuous person might pull us in the other direction, toward less severe blame. In this
way, moral character might serve as a kind of proxy for mental state, so that a person with a bad
character is blamed as if he were reckless, whereas a person with a good character is blamed as if
he were not reckless. The experiment reported here tests this idea.

6

I am assuming, for the sake of this example, recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
7
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
8
This example appears in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 600
(2001). Ferzan explores the problematic space in between recklessness and negligence. Using the current example,
suppose we can infer only that the driver recognized, on a very general level, that driving while dialing a cell phone
is a dangerous thing to do, but nothing more. This state of mind -- dubbed “opaque recklessness” by Ferzan -- does
not, strictly speaking, meet the MPC definition of recklessness because the driver did not consider and disregard the
risk of death. According to the hypothesis discussed in the text herein, the opaquely reckless driver would be
blamed, in part, according to available information about his moral character. In fact, moral character information
might have an especially strong inference when mental state is ambiguous or is located in the liminal space between
two culpability categories, as arguably is the case with opaque recklessness.
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A third focus of this article is moral emotion as the mechanism through which moral
character influences blame. 9 When we observe a moral violation, we often react emotionally.
When we hear about a thug who snatches a purse from a vulnerable elderly victim, we feel
angry. When we hear about the trauma experienced by a sexual assault survivor, we feel
sympathy. When we learn about the sadistic murder of a child, we feel disgust. Experiencing
moral emotions can cause us to make harsher moral judgments. 10 The experiment reported in this
article seeks first to establish the link between perceiving someone’s moral character and
experiencing emotion. Specifically, the experiment tests the idea that, compared to an otherwise
virtuous person who causes harm, an otherwise bad person who causes harm makes us feel
angrier and more disgusted, which in turn leads to more punitive attributions of blame. These
emotion-charged blame judgments have potentially important implications for basic social–
psychological mechanisms involving blame, and can inform our understanding of blame both
within the legal system and outside of it in everyday social life. This process of inculpation,
infused with emotion and driven by character inferences, can help to explain the charging
decisions of prosecutors, the claiming decisions of injured people, the settlement behavior of
litigants, and the punitive damages decisions of juries, among many other examples.
Prior empirical research on the influence of prior conviction on legal judgments of guilt
has focused on the “whodunit” question: Given the defendant’s prior record and other evidence
presented, what is the probability that he committed the offense in the instant case? By contrast,
the focus of the study presented in this article is quite different: Given that the actor undisputedly
9

Moral emotions can be thought of as those emotions that are evoked by a threat to or violation of a personally
valued moral principle. See C. D. Batson, What’s Wrong with Morality?, 3 EMOTION REVIEW 230, 233 (2011).
10
See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and
Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 570 (1998)
(noting that participants that were anger-primed made more punitive attributions than other participants); Thalia
Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780, 780
(2005) ("[M]oral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust.").
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performed a specific act causing a particular result, with a specifically described mental state,
what is the marginal influence, if any, of the actor’s moral character on observers’ judgments of
blame? Whereas earlier empirical work on prior conviction focused on the probability that the
defendant committed the offense, the current study focuses on character-driven, emotionally
infused blame judgments, given that the actor did cause the posited harm. The results of the
current study suggest that perceptions of moral character and resulting moral emotions not only
drive blame judgments but also the putatively fixed judgments of causation and intent as well.

II
MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME
Consider the following scenario: 11 John was speeding to get home, driving 40 mph in a
30 mph zone. He came to an intersection and applied the brakes but was unable to stop in time
because of an oil spill on the road. 12 John hit another car in the intersection, injuring the other
driver. John was speeding home in order to:
a) Hide from his parents an anniversary present for them that he had left out in the open ,
OR
b) Hide from his parents a vial of cocaine he had left out in the open .
When people think about this scenario, those who learn that John was hiding cocaine think that
he was more responsible for the accident, on average, than those who learn that John was hiding
a present. 13 From the perspective of legal responsibility, this is an odd result, given that John’s
behavior, the other driver’s behavior, and the accident scene are the same in each scenario.
11

This scenario and results described herein are reported in Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (1992).
12
Alternatively, the stop sign was obscured by a large tree branch. Id. The pattern of results described below is the
same in the oil and tree branch variations. Id. at 370.
13
Id.
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John’s state of mind, of course, was different—in the sense that the object that he sped home to
hide was different. But comparing the two scenarios, John’s state of mind was not different in
any legally relevant way. If John is liable for the accident, it is because he was negligent—he
should have foreseen that his speeding caused a risk of harm. The foreseeability of the harm is
the same in each scenario, as is John’s failure to exercise reasonable care.
Besides differences in responsibility judgments, there is another oddity that emerges in
reactions to this story. Not only do people think John is more responsible, but they also think he
is more of the cause of the accident when the object he was thinking about hiding was cocaine,
rather than a present. 14 From the perspective of legal causation, this also presents something of a
puzzle. The chain of events between the accident and the injury is exactly the same in each
scenario. The risk of colliding and injuring another person does not differ from one scenario to
the next, and neither does John’s breach of the standard of due care. What does differ, however,
is John’s motivation for engaging in the act that led to the collision. In the scenario involving the
cocaine, John’s motivation for speeding was nefarious; in the scenario involving the present,
John’s motivation for speeding was laudable (despite the fact that it does not outweigh the
foreseeable risk of injury).
In light of the drug-related nature of John’s nefarious goal in the cocaine scenario, one
might object that, in fact, people might have imagined his conduct to be different from the
anniversary present scenario. Perhaps people thought that John was under the influence of
cocaine at the very moment of the collision, thus making him more responsible. Or, perhaps
John’s goal of hiding cocaine was more distracting than the goal of hiding a present, so that in
the cocaine scenario people interpret John as having paid less attention. Or, perhaps in the
cocaine scenario people imagined John driving faster than in the anniversary present scenario—
14

Id.
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even though the speed was specified to be the same in both versions—so that John seemed more
responsible and his actions more causal for those reasons.
There is further evidence, however, supporting the hypothesis that an actor’s bad motive
can result in harsher judgments of blame and causation for harm. In previous work, 15 we
presented people with a scenario involving a man—Sam—who stored oxygen tanks in his
backyard shed. When a cigarette butt landed near the shed, the tanks accidentally exploded and a
neighborhood youth was killed. Just as blame and causation judgments were harsher for John the
driver when he had a bad motive for speeding, judgments of blame and causation in this study
were harsher for Sam when he had a bad motive for storing oxygen tanks in his shed.
Specifically, if Sam stored oxygen because he was a high school football coach who cheated by
giving oxygen to his players, he was judged to be more responsible, more blameworthy, and his
role more causal in the accidental death of the youth compared to if he stored oxygen to care for
his sick daughter. 16
In the oxygen study, it is implausible that participants perceived that there was any
greater danger or risk of oxygen explosion in the football scenario than in the sick daughter
scenario. Rather, it must have been Sam’s bad motive that prompted people to perceive him as
more blameworthy, responsible, and causal in the football scenario. Perhaps, however, these
differences in blame and perception of causation are not so anomalous, from a legal perspective.
After all, the social value of the conduct of storing oxygen tanks to care for a sick child is greater
than that of cheating at football. And the social value of speeding home to surprise loved ones
15

Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2. See Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision
Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 3, 11–13 (1999) (demonstrating that
when an investor was motivated by malicious greed, perceivers were more likely to positively assess arguments
supporting liability for libel, compared to when he was motivated by honest concern).
16
In a third neutral condition, the man stored oxygen for delivery as part of his home health care business. In this
scenario, judgments of blame and causation were roughly midway between those in the football cheating scenario on
the one hand, and the sick daughter scenario on the other. Id.
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with a gift is greater than that of hiding illegal drugs. When the social value of conduct is
sufficiently great, this can justify the risk that is assumed by the actor. In tort law, a reasonable
person considers the risk of harm in light of the utility of the conduct. 17 Thus, a vaccine that
carries a risk of harming 1 in 1000 children might be considered reasonable given the social
value of the vaccine; a piece of candy that carries the same risk of harm would not.
Like tort law, criminal law takes into account the extent to which the actor’s risky
behavior was justified when assigning liability for crimes involving recklessness. The Model
Penal Code test focuses on “the nature and purpose” of the actor’s conduct and its surrounding
circumstances. 18 Depending on the nature and purpose of the conduct, the actor’s disregard of
the associated risk might be considered consistent with the standards of a law abiding person, on
the one hand, or a gross deviation from those standards, on the other. In the latter case, the actor
would be deemed to have acted with a reckless state of mind. Thus, for example, a surgeon who
disregards a substantial risk of death to the patient in performing a dangerous operation might be
justified in doing so if the purpose of the conduct is to save the patient’s life, and there is no safer
way to do so. On the other hand, if the purpose of the conduct is something other than saving the
patient’s life (for example, testing a new surgical technique), it is unlikely that the risk of harm
would be justified.
In light of the legal standards for risky conduct in tort law and criminal law, it is perhaps
not so anomalous that in the two studies described, people would consider John the cocaine hider
more blameworthy than John the present hider, and Sam the football cheater to be more
blameworthy than Sam the father of the sick child. Putting to the side the issue of
blameworthiness, it is perhaps still puzzling why people would see an actor with a bad motive
17

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 (1965). See also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
18
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
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more causal in the chain of events leading to harm. As a general matter, there is evidence that
causal proximity influences blame judgments. 19 Thus, harm that occurs by touching or other
personal contact with the victim is judged to be less morally permissible than the same harm that
occurs without personal contact. 20 But in the cocaine–present study, and in the oxygen tank
study, causal proximity does not seem to vary between the good motive and bad motive
scenarios. To the contrary, in both versions of the scenario in both studies, there is really no
question about the extent to which the actor caused the harm. In the cocaine–present study, John
failed to stop his car at the stop sign and collided with another car. To be sure, there were other
causal factors contributing to the accident. 21 But under any plausible account of causal
explanation for the harm, John’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the proximity of
his actions to the harm was the same in each version of the scenario. Similarly, in the oxygen
tank study, Sam’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the proximity of his actions to
the harm was the same in each version of the scenario. In both studies, therefore, there seems to
be no obvious, straightforward explanation as to why having a bad motive would transform
conduct into a stronger cause of harm.
Mark Alicke’s theory of culpable control represents one attempt to explain this puzzle.
The theory posits that when people assess blame, they try to gauge the extent to which the actor
exercised control over the outcome. 22 If an actor acts intentionally and that action directly causes

19

See Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three
Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1086 (2006) ("Subjects rated . . . harm involving physical contact as
morally worse than harm without contact.");
20
See Id.; Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293
SCIENCE 2105, 2105–06 (2001) (noting that most people find pushing a stranger off a bridge to be more troubling
than flipping a switch causing a runaway trolley to hit a stranger, even though both actions resulted in five lives
being saved).
21
In one version of the scenario the road was slippery because of a prior oil spill; in another version, the stop sign
was partially obscured by a tree branch. There were no notable differences in the results between these two versions
of the scenario.
22
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 557 (2000).
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the outcome, then the actor is perceived to have high control; conversely, if there is an absence
of intent and there was a long chain of events that caused the outcome, then the actor is
perceived to have low control. How much intent did the actor have? How strongly causal was the
actor’s role in the harm? It is well understood that these judgments often are made under
uncertainty. 23 Alicke argues that perceptions of intent and harm are directly influenced by our
initial affective reaction to the harm situation. 24 Once strong negative reactions are evoked by
harmful conduct, then people’s desire to blame kicks into gear, and their assessment of factors
like foreseeability, intent, and causation is colored by their motivation to understand the conduct
as highly blameworthy. 25 On this account, people blame early, then justify the blame assessment
by pointing to corresponding levels of foreseeability, intent, and causation. Thus, John the
cocaine hider evoked a strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high blameworthiness
for the accident and injury, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to justify the
blame attribution after the fact. John the present hider evoked a reaction that was less strongly
negative, so less extreme judgments of blame and causation followed. Similarly, on this account,
Sam the football cheater evoked a strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high
blameworthiness for the youth’s death, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to
justify the blame attribution; the reactions to Sam the father of the sick daughter were less
negative. On this account we engage in “blame validation”: we make blame attributions

23

See Alicke, supra note 11 at 368.
Id. at 558.
25
The study of motivated cognition in law has received increased attention in recent years. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan,
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
729 (2010); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction,
64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755706;
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The
Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: Legal Implications of Outcome-Driven Reasoning 100
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at SSRN:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641022.
24
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spontaneously according to how strongly negative our gut reaction is; then we validate our blame
assessment by tuning evaluations of causation and intention accordingly.
Alicke’s blame-validation model posits that we have an immediate negative reaction to
an actor with a bad motive who caused harm, which leads to a fast, automatic initial blame
judgment. 26 This initial blame judgment then guides subsequent perceptions about the actor’s
causal role in producing the harm. The extent to which this type of blame-early account
accurately describes moral decision making is a matter of dispute among social psychologists
and experimental philosophers. 27 Alicke’s model is a version of a “blame early” model. By
contrast, the blame-late models posit that once a perceiver detects a harmful event, she assesses
causation and mental state before coming to a conclusion about blame. 28 More research will be
required in the future to sort out the causal order of blame and related attributions. Regardless of
whether blame in fact comes early or late, there remains strong evidence that an actor’s bad
motive for acting (for example, hiding drugs, cheating at football) can influence perceptions of
causation.
We have seen that bad motive can increase attributions of blame and causation. We have
also seen that law takes into account motive as sometimes relevant to whether an actor is
justified in disregarding a risk of harm. Therefore, at least with regard to blame, the law takes
account of people’s natural inclination to blame according to the actor’s motive, even if the
motive–causation connection is not explicitly accounted for in law. But reason for acting is only
one example of how people’s initial evaluation of an actor might push them toward harsh
26

Alicke, supra note 22, at 558.
Compare note 25, and Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001), with Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing
the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353 (2008), and Bertram F. Malle
et al., Moral, Cognitive, and Social: The Nature of Blame, SOC. THINKING & INTERPERSONAL BEHAV. (Joseph P.
Forgas, et al., eds., 2012).
28
Malle et al., supra note 27.
27
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judgments of blame or pull them toward lenient judgments. There are many other variables that
enter into the blame equation. Some variables are more familiar, such as the severity of the harm,
or the actor’s intent. But other potential antecedents of blame are considered more problematic,
at least by some theorists. On the one hand, it is well settled that an actor’s race, for example, or
nationality, or religion should not influence our perceptions of blame for harm caused by that
actor. 29 On the other hand, law sometimes permits consideration of an actor’s motive. 30 In this
vein, consider another characteristic: the actor’s moral character. The fact that John the cocaine
hider was perceived as more blameworthy and causal than John the present hider might have
been as much a function of John being derogated as a drug user as John’s motives being
derogated as illegitimate. Thus, an actor’s bad motive might simply establish that the subsequent
harm was not justified by the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct, as the law explicitly
recognizes. Alternatively, an actor’s bad motive might serve as a proxy for that actor’s bad moral
character, which is derogated and leads perceivers to blame more harshly.
There is evidence for the proposition that our perception of a person’s motive is
important for our understanding of that person’s moral character. For example, a soccer player
who intentionally spikes a player on the opposing team is seen as being less moral as a person
when his motive was for personal gain (trying to win the game) than when his motive was
reactionary (retaliation for being recently bumped and taunted by the other player). 31 Similarly, a
person who administers an electric shock to another person for monetary gain is rated less moral
than a person who shocks another person to avoid being shocked himself. 32 The influence of
motive on perceptions of moral character can sometimes be dramatic, transforming an outlaw
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f).
See footnote 18, supra.
31
Glenn D. Reeder et al., Inferences About the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of Perceived Motive, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 789, 792–94 (2002).
32
Id. at 794–95.
29

30
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into a hero, or at least an anti-villain. Consider, for example, the television character named
Omar Little on the HBO series The Wire. Omar robs and kills drug dealers for a living, but at the
same time upholds his own moral code, which entails not harming law-abiding citizens, and no
thuggery on Sundays. Because there is a kind of purity in his motives, Omar garners more moral
admiration than condemnation. Motive, therefore, can make or break perceptions of moral
character.
In everyday social life, sorting the “bad guys” from the “good guys” plays an important
social function. When we encounter a new person, we immediately size up her “perceived
intent”—traits like friendliness, trustworthiness, and helpfulness signal whether the other is a
friend or foe. 33 We make these judgments remarkably quickly. In one study, for example, when a
photo of a face was flashed for a fraction of a second, people were most reliable at judging
trustworthiness, compared to other traits like competence and likeability. 34 We are especially
keen to size other people up first on moral traits, and only later on non-moral traits (such as
competence and intelligence), perhaps because the friend or foe question is an especially
important one when encountering a stranger. 35
The primacy of moral character judgments suggests that these concerns might infuse the
process of blaming. That is, when we are deciding the extent to which to blame an actor who has
caused harm, we might be implicitly asking ourselves, “To what extent is this actor a bad
person?” rather than (or perhaps in addition to) “To what extent is this particular action

33

See Susan T. Fiske et al., Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence, 11 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 77, 77 (2007) (describing the fundamental nature of the two dimensions of warmth and
competence in social cognition).
34
Janine Willis & Alexander Todorov, First Impressions: Making Up Your Mind After a 100-Ms Exposure to a
Face, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 592, 594 (2006).
35
See id.; Bogdan Wojciszke et al., On the Dominance of Moral Categories in Impression Formation, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1251, 1254–55 (1998) (finding that subjects found moral traits to be more
important than competence traits when forming impressions of strangers).
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wrong?” 36 Because blaming might be focused to a large extent on perceptions of the actor’s
moral character, then anything that influences our perceptions of the actor’s moral character is
likely to influence our judgments of blame for harm. Character perceptions might be gleaned
from the act itself. For example, consider a large man walking down a narrow hallway who
bumps a passerby with his shoulder, and then calls the passerby a derogatory name. Those
actions, in themselves, are likely to trigger negative perceptions of the actor’s moral character. If
blame judgments derive primarily from character judgments, then the blame process is relatively
simple: only a bad person would do such a thing, so this actor is to blame. If blame judgments
are constructed by assessing various factors surrounding the act, then the process is quite
different: we examine the extent to which the harm was intentional, the extent to which the actor
caused it, and the severity of the harm, and then decide whether the act was wrong, and finally
whether the actor had any excuse or justification. The latter process can be thought of as actbased blaming, as opposed to character-based blaming. The result may be the same (at least in
some cases), but the focus is quite different. The main point to note here is that act-based
blaming does not consider the actor’s moral character.
The study of John the driver suggests that we do, in fact, engage in character-based
blaming, at least insofar as information about John’s motive for speeding (hiding cocaine or
hiding a present) informs our perception of John’s moral character. The case of Sam—the man
who stored the oxygen tanks in his shed illustrates even more clearly that we engage in character
based blaming. In our experiment, not only did we find that people blame Sam more harshly
when his motive was cheating rather than caretaking, but we also found that Sam’s motive

36

See David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, Bringing Character Back: How the Motivation to Evaluate Character
Influences Judgments of Moral Blame 97, in The SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF
GOOD AND EVIL (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver, eds., 2011)) (“[P]roposing a person-based character
approach as an alternative to the act-based theories.”).
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influenced perceptions of Sam’s moral character: Sam who stored oxygen to cheat was judged to
have less of a moral character, be less trustworthy, and be more of a bad person than Sam who
stored oxygen to take care of his sick daughter. 37 Thus, to judge moral character people
sometimes use information derived from the act itself (as in the shoulder bump example), and
they sometimes use information derived from the motive for the act (as in John the driver and
Sam the oxygen storer). In either case, to the extent that the blaming process focuses on the actor
rather than the act, inferences about character will inform perceptions of blame, no matter how
they were derived,.
In this article, I expand the inquiry begun earlier regarding the relationship between
moral character and blame. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which information about
moral character influences blame even when that moral character information is independent
from the harmful act. For example, if Joe kills a man in a bar fight, do we blame him less if we
also learn that Joe spends his free time as a volunteer tutor for underprivileged youth?
Conversely, do we blame him more if we learn that Joe is a greedy miser who refuses to help
support his elderly mother? There is already some evidence that suggests that independent
information about moral character can influence blame judgments. 38 In one study, participants
read a story about Jack, who argued with and then pushed another man. The man slipped and
suffered serious injuries. Jack was presented as someone who helped a stranded motorist, gave
extra time off to a worker, and volunteered at a homeless shelter, or alternatively, as someone
who drove by the motorist, denied the time off to the worker, and made an excuse to not
volunteer at the homeless shelter. People rated “bad Jack” as more to blame for the victim’s
injuries than “good Jack.”
37

Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2.
Mark D. Alicke, Evidential and Extra-Evidential Evaluations of Social Conduct., 9 J. SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 591, 595–601 (1994).
38
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I sought to replicate and extend this finding. First, in the experiment reported in this
article, I focused on the influence of independent evidence of character on judgments of blame
when the severity of the harm is extreme—that is, death. It is possible that when the resulting
harm is grave, the impulse to blame becomes so strong that it overwhelms any potential
influence of independent information about moral character. The plausibility of this hypothesis is
supported by numerous experimental studies that consistently find that actors are blamed more
harshly for severe harm than for mild harm, even when other circumstances are held constant. 39
An alternative, competing hypothesis, is that independent information about moral
character influences blame judgments even for severe outcomes such as death. This hypothesis is
supported by the results of the study involving Sam, who was found more blameworthy for an
accidental death when his motive for storing the oxygen was bad than when it was good. In that
study, bad motive led to perceptions of bad moral character, which led to increased blaming. By
contrast, in the experiment reported here, moral character is derived not from motive, but from
information largely independent of reasons for acting. According to this competing hypothesis,
information about moral character will influence judgments of blame for a severe outcome
regardless of whether the moral character inference derives from the actor’s motive or from an
independent source.
The second aim of the experiment reported in this article was to examine variations in the
actor’s state of mind, to ascertain whether the influence of moral character information varies
according to the actor’s level of awareness of the risk of harm (for example, reckless versus
negligent). It is well established empirically that blame judgments generally increase with

39

For a review, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: A Meta‐Analytic
Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000) (demonstrating that people attribute greater responsibility for a
harm when the harm is severe than when the harm is minor).
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increasingly culpable states of mind, 40 so that an actor who causes harm recklessly, for example,
is perceived as more blameworthy than one who causes harm negligently. 41 The joint influence
of bad moral character and culpable mental state might be additive. It might be the case, for
example, that a negligent actor with a bad moral character is blamed just as harshly as a reckless
actor—in this sense, moral character becomes a kind of proxy for a more culpable mens rea. In
addition, a reckless actor with good moral character might receive more lenient treatment in
terms of perceptions of blameworthiness, and be blamed only as much as a negligent actor. The
experiment reported here tests these possibilities.
A related hypothesis regarding moral character and mental state is that people’s
perceptions of mental state themselves are influenced by the actor’s moral character. For
example, people might perceive an act as intentional precisely because it was performed by an
actor with a bad moral character, whereas that same act might be perceived as merely reckless if
the actor’s character is good (or if character information is absent). After all, mental state is
rarely if ever completely knowable. In making the uncertain determination about mental state,
people might use information about character to fill in the blanks. 42 As Pizarro and Tannenbaum
put it, “Bad people, by definition, are likely to desire and intend bad things.” 43 The epistemic
elusiveness of the mental states of others suggests the possibility that our judgments about those
mental states are vulnerable to a variety of influences. Experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe
argues that intentionality judgments are more than just factual descriptions of others’ mental

40

That intentionally doing something bad is worse than doing it unintentionally is understood by children, see John
M. Darley et al., Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of Children and Adults, 49 CHILD DEV. 66,
67–68 (1978), as well as by adults, see John M. Darley et al., Doing Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010); Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An
Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001).
41
See Jones et al., this volume.
42
See Pizarro & Tannenbaum, supra note 36, at 11–12 (“For instance, if there is evidence that an individual is a bad
person, the inference that he or she intended a negative outcome seems reasonable.”).
43
Id. at 12.
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states—they are also normative judgments about praise and blame. 44 Experimental evidence
supports this view, and suggests that moral judgments about an act and its outcome can affect
perceptions about the extent to which that act was performed intentionally. For example, people
are more likely to say that a company executive intentionally caused an outcome if the outcome
was negative (harming the environment) than if the outcome was positive (helping the
environment). 45 This is true despite the fact that in both versions of the vignette, the executive
said that he did not care about harming or helping the environment, he only cared about making a
profit. This suggests that people perceive the executive who caused the negative outcome as a
bad person who must be punished, and in an effort to justify that punishment, they interpret his
act as intentional. 46 The possibility that intentionality judgments are infused with moral
judgments suggests that the moral character of the actor influences judgments of intentionality.
Unlike Knobe’s intentionality studies, we vary the moral character of the actor, rather than the
valence of the outcome.
Finally, in this study we investigate the influence of emotion on blame. Moral violations
provoke emotional reactions in observers. 47 For example, when considering the moral quandary
regarding whether one ought to push a large stranger off a footbridge to his death in order to save
five people from a runaway trolley, people become very emotionally engaged at the thought of
pushing someone to their death. 48 By comparison, people are less emotionally engaged at the
thought of flipping a switch to redirect a runaway trolley to save five people, even though, as

44

See Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315, 317–19 (2010).
Id.
46
See id.
47
See Greene et al., supra note 20.
48
Id. at 2106.
45
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before, one person will be killed as a result. 49 Depending on the features of the situation,
thinking about harm can engage a variety of emotionally laden processes.
Witnessing behavior that poses a threat to the integrity of the social order typically
triggers contempt, anger, disgust, or some combination of these. 50 These moral emotions are
associated with disapproval of others’ behavior, and they arise spontaneously upon observing an
actor causing harm. The experience of contempt, anger, or disgust triggers the response tendency
to blame and punish. 51 In fact, when blame and punishment goals are frustrated, “moral
spillovers” can occur, in which observers who learn about an unpunished transgressor become
more punitive toward unrelated acts of harm, 52 or even engage in deviant behavior themselves. 53
Thus, another aim of this study is to demonstrate that a harmful outcome caused by an actor with
a bad moral character provokes in observers negative emotional reactions in the form of anger,
contempt, and disgust, which then lead to an increased tendency to blame and punish.
In the experiment that follows, I investigated the extent to which moral character, apart
from motive or reasons for acting, influences judgments of blame, intent, causation, emotion, and
punishment. To accomplish this, I varied two factors: the moral character of the actor (good or
bad) and the mental state of the actor (aware or not aware of the risk of harm).

49

Id.
See Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger,
Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 575
(1999) (arguing that contempt, anger, and disgust are related "emotional reactions to the moral violations of others").
51
See Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ.,
Olin Working Paper No. 346, 2007) (examining the relation between indignation and the response tendency to
punish the guilty actor) available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1002707; Lerner et al., supra note 10, at 570 (noting the
role that anger plays in justice judgments).
52
See Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 781, 787–89 (1999) (examining the relationship between anger over injustice and determinations of who
deserves punishment).
53
See Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239, 1243 (2008) (finding that observing outcomes that violate strongly held
moral beliefs can lead to engaging in deviant behavior."); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399,
1440 (2005) (arguing that perceptions of injustice in the law can sometimes lead people to display a greater
willingness to disregard the law ).
50
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III
EXPERIMENT: THE EFFECT OF RECKLESSNESS AND CHARACTER ON MORAL EMOTION AND BLAME

The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that bad moral character influences
perceptions of blame, and that this influence increases as mens rea weakens. A group of adults
volunteered to participate in an online questionnaire which varied both the moral character of the
wrongdoer and the wrongdoer’s mental state. The case is loosely based upon People v. Hall, 54 a
Colorado Supreme Court case that held that a skier who causes death can be tried for reckless
manslaughter. Some of the facts of the actual Hall case were retained, but fictional details were
added to permit variation of moral character and mental state.
A. Participants

A total of 201 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web
service, which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online.
Participants were paid $1.50 for completing the survey, which took about five minutes.
Participants were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying
information would not be collected. Seven participants were excluded because they failed to
correctly respond to an instructional manipulation check, 55 leaving a sample size of 194
participants. Of these, 83% identified as White, 4% as Black, 2% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian
Pacific, 4% as South Asian, 1% as Middle Eastern and 1% as other. Sixty-seven percent were
54

999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000)
See Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical
power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (describing instructional manipulation checks as a question
embedded within the experiment requiring the participant to confirm reading the instruction). In our experiment, we
asked “According to the story, Nathan spent most of his free time doing what?” and asked respondents to choose
one of four options: Watching television; Volunteering; Reading; None of the above.
55
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college educated. The mean age was about forty-one years. Women comprised 61% of the
sample. 56
B. Design and Materials

Participants were randomly divided and placed into one of four groups, based on the two
independent variables. The first variable, moral character, had two levels: good or bad. The
second variable, recklessness, also had two levels: low or high. The variables were incorporated
into the vignette that follows. The experimental design was two by two between subjects, so that
each participant saw only one of the four versions of the vignette, reproduced below:
Nathan is a 24 year old man who works as a ski lift operator on Vail Mountain in
Colorado. He is an experienced skier and was a member of his high school skiing team.
[Good Character]: Nathan is considered a model employee. He always arrives on time for
his shift, and works hard. His supervisor considers him responsible and reliable. From
May through September, when the ski slopes are closed, Nathan spends his time
volunteering at a local animal shelter, as well as helping his family run their small
business.
[Bad Character]: Nathan is not considered a good employee. He often arrives late for his
shift, and is sometimes caught absent from his post. His supervisor considers him
irresponsible and unreliable. From May through September, when the ski slopes are
closed, Nathan spends his time loafing around town and watching TV. His family has a
small business but he rarely helps them out with their work.
One day in April, after finishing his shift, Nathan left his post at the top of the mountain
and headed down the hill. He was skiing very fast, ski tips in the air, his weight back on
his skis and his arms out to his sides. It was late in the day, and there were only a few
skiers on the slope.
[Low Recklessness]: Nathan felt confident that he could avoid anyone in his path, but
then he lost control.
[High Recklessness]: Nathan was feeling reckless that day, and he knew there was a risk
he might hit someone but he didn’t care, and then he lost control.

56

Although we did not collect additional demographic information in this particular experiment, similar recent
experiments conducted by the author drawing from the same Mechanical Turk population yielded samples that were:
95% U.S. residents for at least the past 12 years; 56% with a household income of less than $50,000 per year; 48%
liberal or very liberal; 28% moderate, 25% conservative or very conservative.
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He was skiing out of control for some time when he took flight off of a knoll, and was
unable to stop when he saw people on the slope below him. Nathan’s ski collided with
the head of one of those people, Alan.
Unfortunately, Alan suffered a severe brain injury and died a few days later. A test of
Nathan’s blood determined that there were no drugs or alcohol in Nathan’s system at the
time of the accident.

Each participant read only one version of the vignette. 57 After reading the vignette,
participants were asked to provide their own personal opinion about Nathan and his role in the
death of Alan: to what extent he is responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much
he is to blame; to what extent he caused the death; how intentional were his actions; and how
foreseeable was death from Nathan’s perspective. All questions were measured on a scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of presentation of these questions was
random.
As a check on the character manipulation, participants rated three items which were
presented in random order: Nathan’s good moral character (1=not at all; 7=very much), Nathan’s
trustworthiness (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the extent to which Nathan is a good person
(1=bad person; 7=good person). As a check on the recklessness manipulation, participants rated
two items presented in random order: the extent to which Nathan believed he could kill someone
because of the way he was skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the extent to which Nathan
believed he could injure someone because of the way he was skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much).
To gauge participants’ emotions experienced as a result of reading the story, we first
asked them how angry they were feeling right now (1=not at all angry; 7=very angry), how
upsetting the story was (1=not at all upsetting; 7=very upsetting). Participants were then asked:
“When you think about Nathan, to what extent do you feel...?” Following this question stem,

57

The four versions of the vignette were: good moral character / low recklessness; good moral character / high
recklessness; bad moral character / low recklessness; bad moral character / high recklessness. Each participant read
only one of these four versions.
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participants separately rated the extent to which they felt disgust, contempt, and compassion
(1=not at all; 7=very much).
Finally, participants assessed deserved punishment by indicating how severely Nathan
should be punished for the death of Alan (1=not at all; 7=very severely), and what kind of prison
term should Nathan receive for killing Alan (1=no prison at all; 4=average imprisonment; 7=life
imprisonment).
C. Results 58

1.

Manipulation Checks

Judgments of Nathan’s moral character, trustworthiness, and goodness were highly
correlated, 59 and were combined into a single measure of perceived overall moral character
consisting of the mean of these ratings. As predicted, perceptions of Nathan’s overall moral
character depended on whether he was described as a responsible worker, volunteer and son
(good Nathan) or an irresponsible worker and son (bad Nathan). 60 This provides evidence that
perceived moral character was successfully manipulated.
The vignette also varied according to Nathan’s awareness of the risk of harm. Judgments
of the extent to which Nathan believed he might kill and believed he might injure someone
because of the way he was skiing were highly correlated, 61 and were combined into a single

58

All analyses were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) unless otherwise noted. An analysis of
variance measures for statistical differences between the means of groups whose data are categorical (as opposed to
continuous). WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 376-81(5th ed. 1994). Throughout the results section of this article,
“significantly” refers to statistical significance, which denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis--the possibility of
no differences between the various groups--at a probability level indicated by the p-value reported. Thus, “p” is
defined as the probability of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that observed if
there were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them. Id. at 267-82.
59
Cronbach’s alpha = .95. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of items, and ranges between
0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. RICK H. HOYLE ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL
RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed. 2002).
60
F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 =.634; Mean (Good Character) = 5.41; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.69.
61
Cronbach’s alpha = .87.
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measure of awareness of risk consisting of the mean of these judgments. As predicted,
perceptions of Nathan’s awareness of risk depended on whether he was described as being aware
or not aware of the risk of injury or death. 62 This provides evidence that the extent to which
Nathan was judged to be aware of the risk of causing injury or death was successfully
manipulated.
2.

Responsibility Judgments

Did moral character and recklessness influence the extent to which Nathan is perceived
as responsible, blameworthy, and judged negatively for the death of Alan? The three dependent
measures were highly correlated, so they were combined into a single measure of Overall
Responsibility. 63 The means are illustrated in Figure 1. Nathan was perceived as having more
overall responsibility for Alan’s death if his character was bad rather than good; 64 Nathan was
also perceived as more responsible if he was aware of the possibility of death or injury,
compared to if he was not aware. 65 These two main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction, 66 depicted in Figure 1. Nathan’s overall responsibility depended on his moral
character, but this difference was more prominent when mens rea was weak—that is, when
Nathan was not aware of the risk of injury or death. Planned contrasts nevertheless confirmed
that “bad Nathan” was perceived to be more overall responsible than “good Nathan,” both when
Nathan’s mens rea was reckless 67 and when it was not reckless. 68

F(1, 191) = 112.60, p < .001, ηp2 =.372; Mean (Aware) = 4.73; Mean (Not Aware) = 2.54.
Cronbach’s alpha=.91.
64
F(1, 193) = 33.61, p < .001, ηp2 =.123.
65
F(1, 193) = 45.19, p < .001, ηp2 =.166.
66
F(1, 193) = 7.58, p < .05, ηp2 =.017.
67
z = 2.57, p = .01.
68
z = 5.63, p < .001.
62
63
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of Alan, by moral character
and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much)
3.

Judgments of Causation

Participants rated the extent to which Nathan caused the death of Alan. Nathan was
judged to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death when he was aware of the risk before he acted,
compared to when he was not aware. 69 As depicted in Figure 2, there was no character-driven
difference in perceived causation when Nathan’s mens rea was reckless. 70 The pattern of means
depicted in Figure 2 suggests that when Nathan was not aware of the risk of death or injury “bad
Nathan” was perceived to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death than “good Nathan.” However, a
planned contrast testing this difference did not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance. 71 Therefore, it is unclear whether moral character played any role in perceptions of
F(1, 193) = 13.68; p < .001, ηp2 =.066; Mean (Reckless) = 6.43; Mean (Not Reckless) = 5.76. We did not detect a
statistically significant main effect of moral character on causation. F(1, 193) = 3.74; p =.127, ηp2 =.011. Mean
(Good Character) = 5.97; Mean (Bad Character) = 6.23. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between
character and recklessness on judgments of causation. F(1, 193) = 1.78; p < .29, ηp2 =.006. Planned contrasts reveal
effects of character within each mens rea category, as detailed in the text.
70
A planned contrast shows no difference between good and bad character within the reckless mens rea group. z =
0.34, p = .74.
71
z = 1.83, p = .067.
69
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causation in this experiment, although the pattern of means suggests that the actions of “bad
Nathan” might have been perceived as more causal than “good Nathan” when mens rea was not

4

5

mean of cause
6

7

reckless. Further research will be required to investigate this relationship.

reckless

not reckless
good Nathan

bad Nathan

Figure 2. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan caused the death of Alan, by moral
character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much)
4.

Judgments of Intent

Participants rated the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally in the death of Alan.
When Nathan’s moral character was bad, he was judged to have acted more intentionally than
when his moral character was good. 72 In addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, when Nathan
was aware of the risk of death or injury, he was judged to have acted more intentionally than
when he acted without awareness. 73 Planned contrasts indicate when Nathan acted recklessly,
“bad Nathan” was perceived to have acted more intentionally than “good Nathan.” 74 Similarly,

F(1, 193) = 17.70, p < .001, ηp2 =.077; Mean (Good Character) = 1.51; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.17.
F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 =.634; Mean (Good Character) = 1.46; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.20. The
interaction between character and recklessness was not statistically significant. F(1, 193) = 1.43; p=.23.
74
z = 3.82, p < .001.
72
73
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when Nathan acted without recklessness, “bad Nathan” was perceived as acting more
intentionally than “good Nathan.” 75 The intention judgment means are depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally toward the death of
Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much)
5.

Judgments of Foreseeability

Finally, participants rated the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable from
Nathan’s perspective. Not surprisingly, the death was judged to be more foreseeable when
Nathan was described as being aware of the risk, compared to when he was not. 76 More
important, participants judged Alan’s death to be more foreseeable from “bad Nathan’s”
perspective than from “good Nathan’s” perspective. 77 Planned contrasts indicate that the
character-driven difference just described emerges only when Nathan acted recklessly; 78 when

75

z = 2.13, p = .03.
F(1, 193) = 32.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .139; Mean (Reckless) = 3.62; Mean (Not Reckless) = 2.39.
77
F(1, 193) = 12.03, p < .001, ηp2 =.051; Mean (Good Character) = 2.65; Mean (Bad Character) = 3.38. The
character*reckless interaction did not reach statistical significance. F(1, 193) = 2.39, p.=.12.
78
z=3.54, p < .001.
76
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Nathan acted without recklessness, there was no reliable difference in foreseeability between

2

mean of foreseeable
3
4

5

“bad Nathan” and “good Nathan.” 79 The foreseeability means are depicted in Figure 4.

reckless

not reckless
good Nathan

bad Nathan

Figure 4. Mean ratings of the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable from Nathan’s
perspective, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much)
6.

Punishment Judgments

Judgments of how severely Nathan should be punished and of what length prison term he
should receive were highly correlated, 80 so they were combined into a single measure, in which a
rating of “1” indicates no punishment and “7” indicates severe punishment. Participants judged
Nathan as deserving more severe punishment when he acted with a reckless mental state
compared to when he was not reckless. 81 In addition, there was a main effect for character, such
that “bad Nathan” was perceived to deserve more severe punishment than “good Nathan.” 82
Planned contrasts confirmed that the increased punishment severity for “bad Nathan” (compared

79

z=1.36, p < .174.
Cronbach’s alpha = .88.
81
F(1, 193) = 54.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .198, Mean (reckless) = 4.46; Mean (not reckless) = 3.15.
82
F(1, 193) = 32.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .119, Mean (bad) = 4.32; Mean (good) = 3.33.
80
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to “good Nathan”) proved statistically significant in both the reckless 83 and not reckless
conditions. 84

Figure 5. Mean ratings of punishment severity, by moral character and awareness (1=no
punishment; 7=severe punishment)
7.

Moral Emotion

Participants indicated how angry they were feeling, how upsetting the story was, and
when they thought about Nathan, to what extent they felt disgust, contempt, and compassion.
The compassion item was reverse coded. All five items were correlated, 85 and were combined
into an index of negative moral emotion.
The two independent variables—mens rea and character—influenced participants’
negative moral emotion. Specifically, when participants learned that Nathan acted with a reckless
state of mind, participants’ moral emotions were more negative than if Nathan’s state of mind
was described as not reckless. 86 Similarly, reading about “bad Nathan” led participants to

83

z =3.45, p < .001.
z =4.66, p < .001.
85
Cronbach’s alpha = .84.
86
F(1, 190) = 27.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .092, Mean (reckless) = 4.21; Mean (not reckless) = 3.34.
84
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experience more negative emotion than reading about “good Nathan.” 87 There was no
statistically significant interaction between state of mind and character. 88
The fact that mens rea and moral character each influenced both moral emotion and
overall responsibility raises the question of whether negative moral emotion mediates the
relationship between character and overall responsibility, as well as the relationship between
mens rea and overall responsibility. Assuming that negative emotion could mediate the
relationship between moral character and perceptions of overall responsibility, 89 we investigated
its statistical significance by first testing whether there is a relationship between character and
participants’ experiences of negative emotion. We found that, indeed, these two factors were
related. 90 A second regression showed that character influenced perceptions of overall
responsibility. 91 Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility on character and moral
emotion simultaneously, and found that moral emotion predicts perceptions of overall
responsibility after controlling for character. 92 Character no longer predicted overall
responsibility after controlling for moral emotion. 93 The indirect nature of the effect of character
on perceptions of responsibility was further confirmed using a bootstrapping procedure. 94 It is
therefore possible that learning about harm caused by an actor with a bad moral character leads
to negative moral emotion, which in turn leads to strong attributions of blame and responsibility.
F(1, 190) = 79.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .269, Mean (bad) = 4.55; Mean (good) = 3.04.
F(1, 190) = 1.89, p = .17.
89
See Klaus Fiedler et al., What Mediation Analysis Can (Not) Do, J. 47 EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.1231 (2011)
(describing how statistical mediation analysis can "examine the degree to which a third variable (Z) accounts for the
influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a
mediator"),
90
β = 1.51, t(190) = 8.24, p < .001.
91
β =1.04, t(190) = 5.06, p < .001.
92
β = .62, t(190) = 9.04, p < .001.
93
β = .09, t(190) = .46, p = .64.
94
See Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and
Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS 879 (2008). Using
5000 bootstrapped resamples of the data, the analysis revealed a 95% confidence interval of .64 to 1.23.
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling procedure which does not impose the assumption of normality of the
sampling distribution. Id. at 880.
87
88
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At the same time it is also possible that stronger mens rea (that is, recklessness) leads
perceivers to experience negative moral emotion, which in turn leads to greater attributions of
blame and responsibility. We tested the statistical significance of this hypothesized relationship
by first testing whether there is a relationship between Nathan’s mens rea and participants’
experience of negative emotion, and found that indeed, these two factors are related. 95 A second
regression showed that Nathan’s mens rea influenced perceptions of overall responsibility. 96
Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility on mens rea and moral emotion
simultaneously, and found that moral emotion predicts perceptions of overall responsibility after
controlling for mens rea. 97 However, mens rea still predicted overall responsibility after
controlling for moral emotion. 98 Thus, it seems implausible that moral emotion mediates the
relationship between mens rea and attributions of blame and responsibility.
One question not yet addressed is the extent to which people consciously endorse the idea
of using the moral character of the actor to gauge judgments of blame, causation, and intent. It is
possible that when we judge blame and responsibility for harm, we deliberately take into account
the actor’s moral character. It might be, for example, that we explicitly infer that a person with a
bad character has caused undetected harms in the past, so that they deserve to be blamed and
punished more now that he is caught. On the other hand, it is possible that when we take account
of moral character in blame judgments, we do so without even realizing it. It might be, for
example, when confronted with two identical harms committed by actors with identical mental
states, we would disavow blaming and punishing differently based upon differences in the
actors’ moral character.

β = -.88, t(190) = -4.29, p < .001.
β = -1.22, t(190) = -6.12, p < .001.
97
β = .56, t(190) = 9.53, p < .001.
98
β = -.76, t(190) = -4.37, p < .001.
95
96

34

LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75

8. Illuminating the Influence of Moral Character
To investigate the extent to which people explicitly endorse using moral character
information to assess an actor’s responsibility, intentionality, and deserved punishment, a follow
up experiment was conducted. The experiment was identical to the first experiment presented in
this article, with one key exception: this time, each participant made judgments about BOTH
“good Nathan” and “bad Nathan”. The recklessness manipulation remained, as in the first
experiment between subjects. Thus, each participant received two versions of the story. In the
reckless version, participants assessed the blameworthiness of reckless “good Nathan” and
reckless “bad Nathan”. In the not reckless version, participants assessed the blameworthiness of
non-reckless “good Nathan” and non-reckless “bad Nathan”. The order of presentation good and
bad moral character was counter balanced, so that half the participants rated “good Nathan” first
and then “bad Nathan” and half did the reverse. Using this method, we assessed the extent to
which participants would try to keep their assessments of Nathan’s blameworthiness consistent
across the two versions of the story that differed only according to Nathan’s moral character.
The participants in this follow-up study -- Experiment 2 -- were recruited in the same method
as the first study, using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service. A total of 48 participants
completed the questionnaire, and were paid $1.50 each. 99 The results revealed that the
differences in perceptions of responsibility, cause, intent, foreseeability, and punishment
demonstrated in the first experiment disappeared when each participant judged both “good
Nathan” and “bad Nathan”. 100 This is illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts overall responsibility
99

Because the design of this experiment was within-subjects, we were able to achieve sufficient statistical power for
hypothesis testing using a smaller number of participants.
100
Causation(reckless): Mean (good) = 6.50; Mean(bad)=6.62. Causation(not reckless): Mean(good) = 5.95;
Mean(bad) = 6.09. Intent(reckless): Mean(good) = 3.16; Mean(bad) = 3.31. Intent(not reckless): Mean(good)=1.64;
Mean(bad)=1.82. Foreseeable(reckless): Mean(good)=3.85; Mean(bad)=4.04. Foreseeable(not reckless):
Mean(good) = 2.73; Mean(bad) = 2.86. Punish(reckless): Mean(good) = 4.73; Mean(bad) = 4.98. Punish(not
reckless): Mean(good) = 3.33; Mean(bad)=3.75. All t’s < 1.0; all p’s> .60.
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judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. When participants judged the overall
responsibility of just one version of Nathan in Experiment 1, their judgment was influenced by
Nathan’s moral character. This was true regardless of whether Nathan’s state of mind was
described as reckless (left panel of Figure 6) or not reckless (right panel of Figure 6). Note that
these statistically significant differences in overall responsibility judgments disappeared in
Experiment 2, when each participant read two stories (about “good Nathan” and “bad Nathan”)
and made two overall responsibility judgments. In this context, participants now perceived
Nathan’s overall responsibility roughly the same, regardless of whether his moral character was
good or bad. The statistically significant differences in perceived responsibility based on the

7

actor’s moral character disappeared when differences in moral character were made explicit. 101

5
4
2

3

mean overall responsibility

6

not reckless

Exp 1: One Story

Exp 2: Both Stories
good Nathan

Exp 1: One Story

Exp 2: Both Stories

bad Nathan

Figure 6. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of Alan, by moral
character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much), comparing Experiment 1 (moral character
between subjects) with Experiment 2 (within subjects).

101

Reckless condition: t(49)=-0.64, p=.74. Not Reckless condition: t(42)=-0.52, p=.70.
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IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

To a large degree, liability in the criminal law is based on the notion of blameworthiness.
For most crimes, liability requires a morally blameworthy act. For example, a person who uses
force against another person in self defense is not criminally liable because under the
circumstance, the act is considered not worthy of blame. Legal blame in criminal law is
predicated on the idea that the actor performed a prohibited act, accompanied by a specific
mental state, without justification or excuse. Yet, the results reported in this article provide
further support for the idea that the blaming process is infused with motivation and emotion, and
not dictated solely by individual acts and their consequences. Humans are social beings, and
blame is a social process. When we observe a harmful outcome, our first reactions are emotional,
and those emotions are informed by our immediate assessment of what kind of person could
have caused this harm. On this account, a person with a bad moral character who causes a
harmful outcome is a person who disrespects the community’s way of life. 102 As observers and
community members, we react to such disrespect with moral outrage, and we experience the urge
to blame and punish. 103 Conversely, we are more willing to exculpate, at least partially, an
otherwise virtuous person who causes harm, because his prior good deeds have in some sense
licensed the transgression. 104

102

See Philip E. Tetlock et al., People as Intuitive Prosecutors: The Impact of Social-Control Goals on Attributions
of Responsibility, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196 (2007) (describing disrespect for a way of life as a
source for outrage).
103
See Kahneman and Sunstein, supra note___.; Samuel H. Pillsbury, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF
MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 33 (1998) (“punishment is deserved according to the wrongdoer’s choice to
disregard another’s value.”)
104
See Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Letting People Off the Hook: When Do Good Deeds Excuse
Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618, 1621–23 (2010) (showing that good deeds reduce
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In this respect, there is some tension between the process of legal blame and the
psychology of moral blame. The experimental results indicate that, as a psychological process,
moral blame is sometimes informed by emotion. Our emotional reactions are not only a product
of the act and the outcome, but also a product of inferences about the general virtuousness of the
person who performed the act that caused the harm. Reading about “bad Nathan” made
participants feel angry, disgusted, and full of contempt; these emotions then led to blaming and
punishing “bad Nathan” more severely than “good Nathan.” The legal blame process is limited
to considerations of mental state, conduct, and result; the psychological blame process includes
those considerations but seems to involve much more, including the emotions of the perceiver
and the moral character of the actor. Other variables, not examined here, can doubtless come into
play in the psychological blame process, including perceptions of victim characteristics. 105
Legal and psychological blame processes also are in tension regarding assessment of the
actor’s mental state. Procedures for legal blame assume an assessment of mental state that is
independent of the moral character of the actor. But the results reported here show that
perceptions of intent, foreseeability, and possibly causation, can be colored by independent
reasons for thinking the actor is a bad person (Figures 3 and 4). Remarkably, this result holds
true even when, as here, the mental state of the actor was clearly specified—Nathan was
described as being either aware or unaware of the possibility of harming someone. Therefore,
even when mental state is “knowable,” we construct mental state from more than just inferences
condemnation when they are in a different domain (for example, crusading against drugs) than the subsequent
transgression (for example, committing sexual harassment)).
105
See Mitchell J. Callan et al., The Consequences of Victim Physical Attractiveness on Reactions to Injustice: The
Role of Observers’ Belief in a Just World, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 433, 441 (2007) ("[W]e found clear evidence that the
death of a physically attractive versus less attractive victim increased participants' punishment reactions."); Mary R.
Rose, Janice Nadler & Jim Clark, Appropriately Upset? Emotion Norms and Perceptions of Crime Victims, 30 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 203 (2006) (examining the possibility that victims expressing less emotion may have less
punishment assigned to the offender); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology
of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 434–37 (2003) (noting that victim characteristics can influence
punishment judgments).
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surrounding the act itself, but also inferences about the goodness or badness of the person who
performed it. We give the benefit of the doubt to a person with a virtuous character who causes
harm; we perceive his actions as less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less
foreseeable than if his character is flawed. Thus, compared to the unreliable loafer, the reliable
employee who helps the local animal shelter and pitches in when his family needs help is blamed
and punished less harshly, and we align our perceptions of his mental state and the harm’s
foreseeability accordingly. Remarkably, it seems that we do not deliberately use character
information to inform responsibility judgments, for when differences in character are made
explicit, as in Experiment 2, we moderate our responsibility judgments so that we hold the
virtuous harmdoer equally responsible as the ignoble harmdoer.
It is not clear why we would want to disavow the influence of the actor’s character in our
judgments of blame and responsibility. After all, a person who is an unreliable worker and an
irresponsible son has demonstrated that he holds “an attitude of indifference to the welfare of
others.” 106 Our impulse to more harshly blame “bad Nathan” for causing the death of the skier
perhaps reflects the inference that just as he was indifferent to his employer, to the patrons he
served in his employment, and to his parents, “bad Nathan” was also indifferent to the welfare of
the person he collided with when he decided to ski in a dangerous fashion. This inference may or
may not accurately reflect “bad Nathan’s” mental state; but it is an inference that is arguably
reasonable to draw.
Recall, as well, that this inference appears to be driven by our emotional reaction to
Nathan. Compared to “good Nathan”, when Nathan was portrayed as having an ignoble
character, his actions triggered more negative emotions involving anger, disgust, and contempt.
That Nathan seemed to be indifferent to the welfare of the people around him made us
106

See Pillsbury supra note 104 at 161.
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emotionally upset, and it is these moral emotions that appeared to drive our impulse not only to
blame and punish more harshly, but also to perceive Nathan as more aware of and intentional
toward the harm, and possibly to have played a more causal role in it. Thus, our own emotional
reactions to harm might inform our perceptions of the harmdoer’s mental state. Our perception of
the harmdoer’s mental state, can in turn, inform our perception of the severity of the harm. In one
study, when people received shocks they thought were intentionally given, they reported them to
be more painful than shocks they thought were unintentional, even though the magnitude of the
shocks was actually the same. 107 Further research is necessary to determine whether emotional
reaction or perceived intention is primary, or alternatively, whether each informs the other in a
feedback loop.
The results of the experiment reported here are consonant with findings regarding the
effect of prior criminal record on actual verdicts. One study examined over 300 criminal trials
and found that in cases where the evidence was weak, there was a positive correlation between
the jury learning that the defendant had committed prior crimes, and the likelihood of
conviction. 108 A juror who hears that the defendant had committed prior crimes might infer that
the defendant is a bad person, which might lead to inferences about mental state, causation, and
blame that we observed in the experiment reported here. Earlier experimental research also
suggests that jurors who hear that the defendant committed prior crimes are more prone to
convict, especially when the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in nature or similar to the
current accusation. 109 These results are consistent with the notion that when we size someone up
as a bad person, we perceive his acts as more causal, his mental states more intentional, his

107

Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1260, 1261 (2008).
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 3, at 1388.
109
See Greene & Dodge, supra note 4, at 69; Hans & Doob, supra note 4, at 237-38; Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 4,
at 753-55; Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 47.
108
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creation of risk more foreseeable, and his blameworthiness greater, than a similarly situated good
person.
It is important to note, however, that the focus of this article is not on the narrow question
of the influence of prior crimes—it is on the broader question of the influence of moral character
writ large, however those inferences about moral character are made, whether through prior
crimes or otherwise. Note that the basis for inferring bad moral character need not be extreme. In
contrast to the prior work examining the role of serious transgressions like having committed a
prior robbery or burglary, the experiment reported here manipulated relatively subtle character
traits, such as being a responsible worker and son. The results demonstrate that we perceive
badness not only in people who have seriously harmed others in the past, but also in those who
tend to free ride within their own social groups; this perceived badness triggers evaluative
emotions that push us toward more punitive attributions of mental state and blame.
Moreover, unlike prior research on the influence of information about prior crimes on
verdict, this article focuses not specifically on verdicts, but rather on the more basic social
psychological question of how blaming processes work. The knowledge gleaned from
investigating basic psychological processes of blame can indeed inform our understanding of
how juries and judges decide on guilt in criminal cases and liability in tort cases. But it can do
much more than that. When a prosecutor decides which criminal offenses to charge in the
indictment, and later, how lenient or harsh the plea agreement will be, these decisions may be
influenced, without her even realizing it, by her perceptions of the moral character of the
defendant. When an injured person decides whether or not to make a claim in tort for
compensation, that potential plaintiff’s decision will likely be influenced by the extent to which
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he blames the other person, 110 and these attributions of blame can be intensified to the extent that
the potential plaintiff perceives the other person as a “bad guy.” When a litigant in a business
contract dispute refuses to settle despite the fact that the offer on the table exceeds his own
lawyer’s estimate of the expected value of going to trial, that stubborn refusal may, in some
cases, relate to the litigant’s perception that the litigant on other side is a bad actor or is acting in
bad faith. And, when a jury awards punitive damages in an amount that reflects its indignation at
the defendant’s conduct, that indignation may derive from the perception that the individuals
involved in the harm were putting profits ahead of human welfare, 111 leading to perceptions that
these were immoral actors. 112 The psychological process of moral blame is a fundamentally
social process, and our judgments of blame are often attempts to address threats to the social
order.

110

See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .
., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 641 (1980) ("[People] are more likely to [see an experience as injurious or voice a
grievance about it] if blame can be placed upon another.").
111
See Kahneman and Sunstein, supra note___.
112
See Reeder et al., supra note___.

